Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to develop optimal strategies for a simple integer choice game with a skew symmetric payoff matrix. The analysis involves the calculation of certain Pfaffians associated with these matrices.
Introduction
Alice and Bob play a game where each secretly chooses a positive integer. If both players choose the same integer then the game is a tie. Otherwise, the player that chooses the smallest integer (say Bob) wins $1 (from Alice), unless the two integers differ by 1, in which case Alice wins w dollars from Bob. Here w is an arbitrary positive integer. This game was partially analyzed by Mendelsohn [4] about 60 years ago. It was also discussed in the book of Herstein and Kaplansky [3] and was further popularized in a book of Martin Gardner [2, Chapter 9.3] .
It will be convenient to use "negative payoffs". For example, if Bob's integer is 1 less than Alice's, then Bob receives the negative payoff v = −w. That means that Bob pays Alice w dollars. This game yields a skew-symmetric payoff matrix A(v) for "the row player" Bob, with v on the first super-diagonal and all 1's above. We A strategy for a player of this game is a list of plays each with a corresponding probability. For example, Bob could have the strategy of playing 1, 2, and 4 with probabilities 2/3, 1/4, and 1/12, respectively (playing every other integer with probability 0). A pure strategy is a strategy where one probability is 1 and all of the rest are 0. For example, Bob's strategy is pure if he plays 4 with probability 1.
An optimal strategy is a strategy that beats or ties any other strategy. It is easily seen that a strategy is optimal if and only if it beats or ties every pure strategy.
Mendelsohn [4] found numbers v 4 < v 3 < v 2 < v 1 = 0 (given below) such that: if v 2 < v < v 1 then the unique optimal strategy entails playing only the integers 1, 2, 3; if v 3 < v < v 2 then the unique optimal strategy plays only the integers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5; and if v 4 < v < v 3 then the unique optimal strategy plays only the integers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. For example, v 2 = (−1 − √ 5)/2 and when v 2 < v < 0, the unique optimal strategy is to randomly choose the integers 1, 2, 3 with respective probabilities v/(2v − 1), 1/(1 − 2v), v/(2v − 1). The aspect of this game that we find to be most striking (and our main reason for studying it) is the radical change in strategy that can be caused by a small change in the payoff v. In Theorem 1.1 below, we extend Mendelsohn's results by explicitly determining the unique optimal strategies for all v < 0 for which they exist. An equivalent (but less elegant) version of Theorem 1.1 was stated without proof in [1, Appendix] .
For m ≥ 1, set
. This is consistent with the notation v 1 , v 2 , v 3 , v 4 in the last paragraph. We have
so v m tends to −∞ quadratically. We define a sequence of polynomials F m = F m (x) recursively as follows: F −1 = 0, F 0 = 1 and
The polynomials indexed by 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 are respectively
For 1 ≤ j ≤ m we define rational functions in v by the formula
The advertised result, which is the main content of Theorem 3.4, is Theorem 1.1. Suppose that there is an odd number k such that
j=1 p j (2k + 1) = 1, and the unique optimal strategy is to choose 1, 2, . . . , 2k + 1 with respective probabilities
This integer choice game can be generalized so that for each i ≥ 1, whenever Bob chooses i and Alice chooses i + 1, Bob's payoff is an amount x i < 0 in lieu of the constant amount v. We will call this more general version the "multivariate game".
The multivariate analogue of the payoff matrix A n (v) is the skew-symmetric n × n matrix
For indeterminates x 0 , x 1 , . . . , we can define multivariate analogues F n = F n (x 1 , . . . , x n−1 ) of the polynomials F n (x) recursively as follows: F −1 = 0, F 0 = 1 and
These polynomials are intimately related to the payoff matrices A n . For example, it will be seen in Section 5 that if n is even,
. Let x denote the infinite vector (x 1 , x 2 , . . . ). In contrast with the single variable case, we do not know an explicit characterization of the set of all vectors x such that the multivariate game has a unique optimal strategy. However, in Theorem 4.2 we present the unique optimal strategy for the multivariate game in the special case that the first 2m + 1 entries of x are contrained to the interior of an explicitly given unit hypercube.
We collect together results on the polynomials F n = F n (x 1 , . . . , x n−1 ) and the payoff matrices A n = A n (x 1 , . . . , x n−1 ) in the Appendix (Section 5). The main result in the Appendix, Theorem 5.8, shows that if no x i equals 1, then ker A 2k+1 (x 1 , . . . , x 2k ) is a one-dimensional space Rt where t is explicitly expressed in terms of the polynomials F n as well as in terms of Pfaffians of the diagonal minors of A 2k+1 . Theorem 5.8 is instrumental in the proof of Proposition 2.2. Propositions 2.1 and 2.2 in Section 2 give a general analysis of optimal strategies for the multivariate game. Proposition 2.2 is applied to prove the main theorems in Sections 3 and 4 (Theorems 3.4 and 4.2).
As indicated above, this paper is dedicated to Roger Howe. We hope that he enjoys it as much as we enjoyed writing it.
Strategies for the multivariate game
In this section, we provide methods for constructing optimal strategies for the multivariate game described in Section 1.
Proposition 2.1. Suppose that there exists a vector
and
Then the unique optimal strategy is to play i with probability 
3). Thus Bob beats or ties every pure strategy, so his strategy is optimal. This argument shows that Bob's strategy is still optimal if the inequalities in (2.2) and (2.3) are not required to be strict.
We now prove uniqueness. Suppose that against Bob's optimal strategy, Alice plays an optimal strategy in which she chooses i with probability r i for i ≥ 1. We have seen that Bob beats every pure strategy exceeding 2k + 1, so r i = 0 for every i > 2k + 1. For brevity, let A denote the payoff matrix in (2.1), and let r denote the column vector (r 1 , . . . , r 2k+1 ). Since Alice's strategy is optimal, all 2k + 1 entries in the vector Ar are ≤ 0. If at least one of these entries were strictly negative, then by (2.2), we would have pAr < 0 . This is impossible, since pA = 0 by (2.1). Thus Ar = 0. Hence by (2.1), r is a scalar multiple of p. Since the sum of the entries of r and the sum of the entries of p both equal 1, we have r = p, which completes the proof of uniqueness.
We will now apply results in the Appendix to refine Proposition 2.1. Proposition 2.2. Assume that x i < 0 for i ≥ 1 and that
Then p 1 +· · ·+p 2k+1 = 1 and the unique optimal strategy is to play i = 1, . . . , 2k +1 with probabilities p 1 , . . . , p 2k+1 , respectively. This strategy is still optimal if the inequalities in (2.5) and (2.6) are not required to be strict.
Proof. In the notation of (2.5), write p = (p 1 , . . . , p 2k+1 ). We need only check that the three conditions of Proposition 2.1 hold. By (2.4) and (2.5) and Lemma 5.6, we have p i > 0 and p 1 +· · ·+p 2k+1 = 1. By Theorem 5.8, ker A 2k+1 (x 1 , . . . , x 2k ) = Rp. Thus (2.1) and (2.2) are proved, and it remains to check (2.3). The left side of (2.3) equals
. . , x 2k ) and Lemma 5.6 implies that this expression is equal to
By Lemma 5.4, this in turn equals the positive expression in (2.6). This completes the proof of (2.3).
We remark that Proposition 2.2 can also be proved by ad hoc methods which are more elementary (but less elegant).
Consider the strategy of choosing i with probability p i for i ≥ 1. We say this strategy is finite if p j = 0 for all sufficiently large j. The next result provides an example of a game with an infinite but no finite optimal strategy.
. . then an optimal strategy is to play i with probability 2 −i for each i ≥ 1. This game has no finite optimal strategy.
Proof. Let r = (r 1 , r 2 , . . . ) with r i = 2 −i . The strategy of playing i with probability r i for i ≥ 1 ties every pure strategy n, because
This infinite strategy is thus optimal. Now consider another optimal strategy in which i is played with probability p i for i ≥ 1, where
. . ), viewed as an infinite column vector. For the infinite payoff matrix A, we have 0 = rA = rAp. Since all entries of Ap are ≤ 0, this implies that Ap = 0. Suppose for the purpose of contradiction that p i = 0 for all i > N, where without loss of generality, N = 2m is even. Then the submatrix A 2m (x 1 , . . . , x 2m−1 ) of A has a nontrivial kernel, so its determinant and thus its Pfaffian vanishes. As was noted above Lemma 5.4, the Pfaffian of A 2m (x 1 , . . . , x 2m−1 ) is F 2m (x 1 , . . . , x 2m−1 ). One can show using the recurrence that
Since this is nonzero, we have the desired contradiction to the assumption that a finite optimal strategy exists.
We remark that the optimal strategy given in Proposition 2.3 is not unique. In fact, for any a with 0 ≤ a ≤ 1/2, it is optimal to play i with probability p i for i ≥ 1, where the sequence p i is defined by the recurrence p 1 = a, p 2 = (1 − a)/2, p 3 = (1 + a)/12, and for n ≥ 4,
For each fixed a, we have 1 = p 1 +p 2 +· · · and p i > 0, except that p 1 = 0 in the case that a = 0. The case a = 1/2 gives the optimal strategy presented in Proposition 2.3.
Strategies for the single variable game
In this section we will assume that all x i = v < 0. We will write A n (v) for F n (v, v, . . . , v) . Our goal is to prove Theorem 3.4.
We have the recurrence relation F −1 = 0, F 0 = 1, F 1 = 1 and for n ≥ 0,
, we have
One can also check directly that the right side satisfies the recurrence, using
k the lemma follows.
Note that ξ 2n,n is the leftmost zero of F 2n and ξ 2n+1,n is the leftmost zero of F 2n+1 . The following properties of ξ n,k are easily checked.
Lemma 3.2.
We have ξ n,k < ξ n,l if k > l, ξ 2n,n < ξ 2m,m and ξ 2n+1,n < ξ 2m+1,m if n > m, and ξ 2n,n < ξ 2n+1,n < ξ 2n+2,n .
Set v n = ξ 2n,n for n ≥ 1. This definition of v n agrees with that given in Section 1.
Moreover, (3.1) holds for all v < v k .
Proof. Let v < v k . Then Lemma 3.2 implies that v is to the left of all the zeros of F n for n ≤ 2k + 1. Since the recurrence implies that the polynomial F n has degree n 2 with positive leading coefficient, (3.1) follows. When also v > v k+1 , (3.2) holds because by Lemma 3.2, v is to the right of exactly one zero of F 2k+2 .
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section.
If v k+1 < v < v k , then all p i > 0 and the unique optimal strategy is to play i with probability
, then this strategy is still optimal, but it is not unique, since it is also optimal to play i + 1 with probability p i for
Proof. By Lemma 3.3, the p i are all well-defined positive numbers. If v k+1 < v < v k , then appealing again to Lemma 3.3, we see that the three conditions of Proposition 2.2 are satisfied. Proposition 2.2 thus shows that playing i with probability p i for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k + 1 is the unique optimal strategy. Now suppose that v = v k+1 . Then this strategy is still optimal, but it is not unique, since by the argument above with k + 1 in place of k, it is also optimal to play j with probability
It remains to show that p i = q i+1 . This can be proved by induction on i, using the recurrence for F n .
Strategies for some constricted multivariate games
For k ≥ 1, let V k be the set of infinite vectors (x 1 , x 2 , . . . ) with x i < 0 for all i ≥ 1 that satisfy the three conditions of Proposition 2.2. When (x 1 , x 2 , . . . ) ∈ V k , Proposition 2.2 describes the unique optimal strategy for the corresponding game. The uniqueness assertion implies that
Note that by Lemma 3. 
. We next determine V 1 . The conditions defining this set are x i < 0 for all i ≥ 1 and
All of the conditions but the last are automatic if the x i are all negative. Thus w+1, w, . . . , w+1, w) = wF 2n−2 (w+1, w, w+1, . . . , w, w+1), n ≥ 1.
Proof. Let h n denote the right side of (4.1). Direct calculation shows that
The left side of (4.1) satisfies the same recurrence, by Lemma 5.4. Since both sides equal 1 for n = 0 and 1 + w for n = 1, we obtain (4.1). Each side of (4.2) also satisfies the recurrence above. Since both sides equal w for n = 0 and w(w + 1) for n = 1, we obtain (4.2). Proof. We note that if 
After some simplification, the right side reduces to
Thus, to prove (4.3), we must show that H > 0. If n < m, these factors in H involve positive cosines, while if n = m, the rightmost factor in H vanishes. This proves (4.3) and (4.4). Finally, (4.5) follows from (4.2).
We are now ready to prove Theorem 4.2. Assume that u m − 1 < x i < u m for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2m + 1. To satisfy the three conditions of Proposition 2.2, it suffices to prove that
It is convenient to work with
. . , x n−1 ). Lemma 5.7 implies that for 1 ≤ j < 2n we have
We first use this formula to prove by induction that G h (x 1 , . . . , x h−1 ) > 0 for 0 ≤ h ≤ 2m + 1. Clearly this holds for h = 0 and h = 1. Assume that it holds for all h < 2n for some n with 1 ≤ n ≤ m. We will prove that it holds for h = 2n and h = 2n + 1. By the induction hypothesis and the derivative formula above, G 2n (x 1 , . . . , x 2n−1 ) is strictly decreasing in x 1 , strictly increasing in x 2 , strictly decreasing in x 3 , etc. Hence
by (4.3) and (4.4). This proves the result for h = 2n. By the induction hypothesis,
so the result holds for h = 2n + 1 as well. It remains to prove that G 2m+2 (x 1 , . . . , x 2m+1 ) < 0. Applying Lemma 5.7 again we find that G 2m+2 has the same monotonicity properties (decreasing in the odd variables, increasing in the even ones), hence
by (4.5) . This completes the proof of Theorem 4.2.
Appendix: Pfaffians associated with payoff matrices
In this section we will analyze the following skew-symmetric m × m matrices over a field F of characteristic 0:
Here the superdiagonal has indeterminate entries 
If A is a skew-symmetric matrix of size m × m with entries a ij then we define
We note if g is an m × m matrix with transpose g T then
If m = 2n with n an integer, then the Pfaffian of A, P f(A), is given by the formula ω
here the n-th power is in the Grassmann algebra. If A is a 2n + 1 × 2n + 1 skewsymmetric matrix then
. Thus, as above, we have an element
Using the standard form (x, y) = x i y i , we can identify
. If A is a matrix then we denote by A r,s the matrix gotten by deleting the r-th row and the s-th column. Note that when A is skew-symmetric, so is A rr . The following lemma is standard but not easily referenced. Lemma 5.1. Let A be a 2n + 1 × 2n + 1 skew symmetric matrix. Then, using the standard form to view T ( Also, as an element of F 2n+1 ,
Proof. We note that there exists g ∈ GL(2n + 1, F ) such that
with 2l equal to the rank of A. We therefore see that
it is enough to show that
for all x ∈ F 2n+1 . For g as above, we must show that
That is, we must show that for all x,
This follows because the image of gAg T is contained in the span of {e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e 2l } and
is either zero or a nonzero scalar multiple of Ω 2n . This proves (5.1). For each j we write
Then we note that ω j is ω Ajj in the basis e 1 , . . . , e j−1 , e j+1 , . . . , e 2n+1 , and
Since the last term is a multiple of e j in the Grassmann algebra, we see that the coefficient of e 1 ∧ · · · ∧ e j · · · ∧ e 2n+1 is P f(A jj ). This proves (5.2).
Set
Lemma 5.2. We have
Proof. Before working with f n , we investigate properties of the following expressions: We have ω A2n = µ n + γ n with µ n = µ n−1 + ν n and γ n = γ n−1 + ξ n . We will write the Grassmann multiplication of elements in the (commutative) even part of the Grassmann algebra without the wedge. We note that since the first sum in the penultimate expression is 0. We write this as
We are now ready to derive the formula for f n . We have
Since C 1 is of degree 2n in e 1 , . . . , e 2n−2 it is 0. We have
We now look at C 3 . Since
This expression is (applying Lemma 5.2 with n − 1 replacing n)
as asserted.
Define the polynomials
In particular, F 2m (x 1 , . . . , x 2m−1 ) equals the Pfaffian of A 2m (x 1 , . . . , x 2m−1 ). The following result shows that these F m are the same multivariate polynomials that were defined by the recurrence in Section 1. Lemma 5.4. The polynomials F n (x 1 , . . . , x n−1 ) as defined above are the solution to the recurrence relation
Furthermore,
Proof. We begin by proving the first recurrence in the even case n = 2k. Writing f n = f n (x 1 , . . . , x 2n−1 ), we have
We next look at the odd case n = 2k + 1. Then
) by the first part of this argument. Hence
Since the initial values are obvious, this completes the proof of the first recurrence.
To prove the second recurrence, note that
This completes the proof of the second recurrence.
Proof. We prove this by induction on n. If n = 2, this says that 1 = F 1 F 1 , which is true. We have
Since F 1 = 1 this proves the formula for i = n − 1. Now
. This proves the formula for i = n − 2. In particular, we now know the formula is valid for n = 3. Suppose that i < n − 2 with n > 3. Then
The induction hypothesis implies that this is equal to We now examine F 2k+1 = F 2k+1 (x 1 , . . . , x 2k ) and A 2k+1 = A 2k+1 (x 1 , . . . , x 2k ). We now turn to the formula for F 2k+1 . This formula is easily checked for k = 0, 1, 2. Let k ≥ 3. We will induct on k. By the second part of Lemma 5.4, we have We now apply the induction hypothesis to F 2k−1 and F 2k−3 to see that F 2k+1 equals Proof. This result is proved by essentially the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 5.5. Proof. By Lemmas 5.1 and 5.6, the vector t described above lies in ker A, and so by Lemma 5.1, it remains to show that t is nonzero. Assume that t is zero. Then  F 2k (x 1 , . . . , x 2k−1 ) = t 2k+1 and F 2k−1 (x 1 , . . . , x 2k−2 ) = t 2k both vanish. But by the first recurrence for the sequence F n in Lemma 5.4, the vanishing of two consecutive terms of the sequence implies the vanishing of all the terms, since x i = 1 for all i. This contradicts the fact that F 0 = 1.
